This paper examines the impact of the Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000, which abolished the Social Security retirement earnings test for those aged 65-69, on the labor supply of older men using data from the 1996-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Based on reduced-form specifications, we find that the repeal of the earnings test increased labor supply on the intensive margin by 12-17%, the bulk of which was concentrated among men with a high-school degree, whose labor supply rose by 19-26%. We formulate a unique test for endogenous reporting of health status by examining how reported health changes with the repeal of the earnings test. We find some evidence of endogenous self-reported health status. In particular, older men were substantially less likely to have reported that health limits their ability to work after, relative to before the earnings test repeal, with the bulk of the effect concentrated among men with high-school degrees, who had the largest labor-supply response to the repeal.
I. Introduction
The impact of Social Security on the work incentives of older individuals is a perennial topic of interest in economics and an important factor in policy debates about the long-run solvency of the program. The key program features in this regard are the Social Security full and early retirement ages, which affect when one claims benefits (i.e., first becomes a beneficiary), and the retirement earnings test, which determines how work affects the time pattern of when benefits are received once one has claimed benefits. Prior to 2000, the earnings test reduced benefits $1 for each $2 of earnings above an exempt amount for beneficiaries under the full retirement age and $1 for each $3 of earnings above an exempt amount for those above the full retirement age but less than 70. Although any such benefit reductions are returned in an actuarially fair manner in later years, the retirement earnings test has been perceived widely as a pure tax on earnings, which, in combination with payroll and income taxation of earnings, placed very high marginal tax rates on the earnings of older workers and has led to concern by economists and policymakers that the test provides a substantial disincentive for work at older ages.
Despite a long line of research that has focused primarily on older men, using both structural and reduced-form methods, and variation in incentives induced by past changes in the earnings-test parameters, the specific role of the earnings test on work and earnings remains unclear. Some studies finding large effects, such as Friedberg (2000) and Haider and Loughran (2005) , among others, and some finding small effects, such as Burtless and Moffitt (1985) , Gruber and Orszag (2002) , and Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) , among others. 1 In this paper, we use data from the 1996-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and employ a reduced-form, quasi-experimental framework to examine the impact on the labor supply of older men from the most sweeping change in the earnings test in the last two decades: the Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000, which repealed the earnings test for beneficiaries between the full retirement age and age 70 beginning in 2000.
We document substantial bunching of earnings at the exempt amount for men between the full retirement age and age 70 prior to 2000 that then disappears upon the repeal of the earnings test. Furthermore, this bunching is concentrated among men with a high-school degree. At the same time, we also find a substantial increase in annual hours associated with the repeal; pooled over all men, hours rose by 12-17%, with the largest effects, again, concentrated among high school graduates, whose hours rose 19-26%.
The impact of the repeal appears only on the intensive margin; there is no evidence that the repeal increased labor-force participation. The pooled labor-supply estimates imply an uncompensated labor supply (hours) elasticity with respect to the wage of 0.24-0.34, larger than typical estimates for prime-age men, but smaller than those for women in the previous literature.
Finally, although it is widely understood that true health status is, in principle, an important determinant of the labor-supply decisions of older individuals, one difficulty, in practice, with using typical survey-based measures of self-reported health status, such as "Does your health limit your ability to work?," that has been long recognized in the literature is that individuals may rationalize being out of the labor force by reporting they are in poor health, so that these measures may be endogenous. We utilize the rich array of information on health in the HRS and formulate a test for endogenous reporting of health status by examining how reported health changes with the repeal of the earnings test. We find some evidence of endogenous self-reported health status. In particular, older men were substantially less likely to have reported that health limits their ability to work after, relative to before, the earnings test repeal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives background on the retirement earnings test. Section 3 describes the theoretical impact of the repeal of the earnings test. Section 4 gives the results on bunching in the earnings distribution, and Section 5 describes the regression specification. Section 6 discusses the estimation results for labor supply. Section 7 presents evidence of the endogeneity of self-reported health status. There is a brief conclusion.
II. Background on the Earnings Test
We begin with the basic rules for Social Security benefit computation that are relevant for the earnings test. First, in each year, earnings in covered employment up to the taxable maximum ($90,000 in 2005) are recorded by the Social Security Administration (SSA), and then at the time the individual claims benefits, the worker's Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) are computed. The AIME is 1/12th of the average of the individual's annual covered earnings, indexed by a national wage index, where only the 35 highest years of earnings count in the average. Second, the AIME is converted into the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), which is a basic monthly benefit, according to a progressive, three-tier benefit schedule. Third, and importantly for the earnings test, the PIA is adjusted for the age at which the benefits are claimed. In particular, if benefits are claimed at the Full Retirement Age (FRA), the monthly Social Security benefit equals the PIA.
2 Table 1 shows the FRA for individuals born between 1926 and 1943, who will form the sample used in the estimation below. Traditionally, the FRA was 65, so that the month in which an individual attained the FRA always occurred in the calendar year in which the individual turned 65. However, as a result of the 1983 Amendments, the FRA was increased by two months for each year of birth from 1938 -1943 and 1955 -1960 . For those born between 1938 and 1941 , and who appear in the analysis sample described below, this means that the month in which the individual attains the FRA may fall in the calendar year in which the individual turns 65 or in the calendar year in which the individual turns 66, depending on the month of birth, which will generate an important source of identifying variation for the earnings test analysis.
Under the earnings test, reductions in benefits are made in relation to the FRA.
Prior to 2000, the earnings test reduced benefits $1 for each $2 of annual earnings above an exempt amount, which, for example, was $8,640 in 1997, for beneficiaries under the 2 If benefits are claimed prior to the FRA, they are decreased by an actuarial reduction factor of 5/9 of one percent per month for the first 36 months prior to the FRA and 5/12 of one percent per month for any months earlier than 36 months, where the earliest age at which benefits can be claimed is age 62, the early retirement age (ERA). If benefits are claimed after the FRA, they are increased according to the delayed retirement credit. Benefits are adjusted for marital status as well. Specifically, in the case of a married couple, the current spouse of the Social Security beneficiary is eligible to receive a dependent-spouse benefit equal to 50 percent of the beneficiary's PIA, or the spouse may claim benefits based on his or her own earnings history.
FRA. For those who had reached the FRA, the earnings test reduced benefits $1 for each $3 of annual earnings above a somewhat higher exempt amount (e.g., $13,500 in 1997). though subject to the test, is treated differently than wage income. In particular, selfemployment income is counted in the year it is received, rather than the year it is earned.
This means the self-employed have the ability to smooth earnings across years potentially to lessen the burden of the earnings test, in a way that those with wage income cannot.
III. Theoretical Impact of the Repeal of the Earnings Test
As has been long understood in the literature, there are three broad theoretical partial-equilibrium responses to have been expected from the repeal of the earnings test from standard models of labor supply when the test is considered a pure tax on earnings.
3 Although the earnings test is widely perceived as a pure tax on earnings, any lost benefits are returned to the beneficiary in later years in accordance with the actuarial adjustment and delayed retirement credit, so that, overall, the earnings test is designed to be actuarially fair. In addition, any annual amounts earned under the earnings test are used to recalculate the 35 highest years of earnings for the basic benefit calculation described above, so that earnings under the test can directly increase benefits in all future years. 4 The monthly test for self-employment income is expressed in terms of hours and degree of effort, rather than dollars of earnings. Because the exempt amount in 1999-the last year before the law change-was $15,500, those locating on the first segment were likely to have been low-skill workers, who, naturally, had low wage rates and for whom even full-time work (i.e., 2,000 hours/year) would have placed them on the first segment. For those located on the third segment, such as high-skill workers, for whom the earnings test was inframarginal, the repeal induced an income effect, and their hours and earnings should have fallen as a result.
For those who located on the second segment, most likely moderate-skill workers, for whom the test had a marginal effect on the net wage rate, the repeal should have induced income and substitution effects, the relative strength of which would have determined the hours' response.
IV. The Repeal of the Earnings Test and the Distribution of Earnings
We begin the empirical analysis by evaluating the first prediction: the bunching of for men 65-70 years old and in the labor force prior to the repeal. 6 The value of zero on the horizontal axis indicates that annual earnings equaled the exempt amount; a negative value means that earnings were less than the exempt amount; a positive value means that earnings were greater than the exempt amount. The figure shows that the bulk of earnings were below the exempt amount, and, more specifically, bunching at the exempt amount.
In comparison, Figure 2B shows the real earnings distribution after the repeal. prior to the repeal. 7 This conclusion is bolstered by Figures 3A and 3B , which show the real earnings distributions for a comparison group of men-those in the labor force, aged 62 to 64, for whom the earnings test was unchanged-before and after 2000, respectively.
For this younger group of men, the real earnings distributions are very similar before and after the law change, both showing evidence of bunching at the exempt amount.
V. Regression Framework and Identification
We begin with a simple difference-in-difference analysis of the impact of the repeal on labor supply, shown in Because there are a variety of ways in which older individuals characterize their labor market attachment (Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier, 1995) While the simple analysis in Table 3 suggests that the repeal of the earnings test had important effects on the labor supply of older men, it has two important limitations.
First, it used the variation in work incentives from the repeal in only a very coarse way.
Second, it did not take into account other factors that may have affected labor supply and may have been correlated with the repeal.
To control for these other factors and better exploit the legislative variation, we expand the analysis into a more sophisticated regression framework. Specifically, we begin with a basic model that is similar to reduced-form specifications estimated in previous studies, such as Gruber and Orszag (2003):
where i and t index the individual and calendar year, respectively, Y represents one of the labor-supply measures, κ is a constant, MarStat controls for marital status, Age is measured in years, Interview is the number of months (since January, 1960) in which that wave's interview took place, τ is a set of year effects, and Z is a vector of timeinvariant characteristics that includes race, educational attainment, and veteran status.
The key explanatory variable, X , is the fraction of the calendar year that the individual is subject to the earnings test based on the year and month of birth.
Specifically, because the repeal treated the earnings of individuals of the same ages (65-70) differently in different calendar years, the 2000 Act induced age-by-time, or year-ofbirth, variation in exposure to the earnings test. This is illustrated in Table 4 , which depicts the sources of variation due to the repeal for the calendar years covered by the HRS and the years of birth used in this study for a man who claims benefits on his 62 nd birthday. Age refers to the age attained on the birthday in that calendar year.
Beneficiaries who fall into cells highlighted in yellow and orange were unaffected by the law change: yellow indicates the beneficiary was subject to the earnings test for the entire calendar year; orange indicates that the beneficiary was subject to the earnings test for The table also illustrates the variation in exposure due to the month of birth, which has three sources. First, prior to the repeal, beneficiaries who turned 70, and fall into cells highlighted in orange, were subject to the earnings test for only part of the year, ending in the month of birth in the year they turned 70. For example, those born in April were subject to the test for 3 months, while those born in October were subject to the test for 9 months. After the repeal, beneficiaries who turned 70 were not subject to the test in any month of that year. These cells are highlighted in purple in the table. Second, prior to the repeal, all beneficiaries in the year they turned 65 were subject to the earnings test for the entire year, regardless of month of birth, but after the repeal, similar beneficiaries were subject to the earnings test until their birth month, generating within-year-of-birth variation in exposure. These cells are highlighted in light green in the table. Finally, after the repeal, the earnings test is applied until the beneficiary reaches the full retirement age, but, as documented in Table 1 , that age has been increased two months per birth year, for each birth year beginning with 1938. This means that, beginning with the 1938 cohort, beneficiaries born in later months of the year were exposed to the earnings test for the entire calendar year they turn 65 and part of the calendar year they turn 66. 8 These cells are highlighted in dark green in the table. To summarize, the repeal induced acrosscalendar-year variation in exposure to the earnings test that varied by year of birth, the impact of which was differential by month of birth as well.
We construct the exposure variable, X , to capture these sources of variation.
Specifically, let cmkt x be the fraction of the calendar year t a beneficiary who was born in year c, month m, and claimed benefits at age k, was exposed to the earnings test based 
and ranges from zero to one.
Because the HRS provides panel data two years apart, we estimate the model in first differences,
where the dependent variable,
, measures the change in the outcome measure in the last 2 years, , with a standard error of 18, which indicates that the repeal of the earnings test increased labor supply of older men by 204 hours per year, and this effect is statistically significant. Relative to the sample mean of 520 hours, the repeal increased annual hours by 39%, which is a substantial impact.
VI. Estimation Results
Because the repeal induced year-of-birth variation in incentives to work, and there may have been important, independent year-of-birth trends in labor supply, column 2 presents estimates in which each regression includes a full set of year-of-birth dummies, so that the estimates are identified off of the month-of-birth variation described above.
This greatly reduces the estimated impact of the repeal. Now, (row 1, column 2),
, with a standard error of 23, which indicates that, relative to the sample mean of 520 hours, the repeal increased annual hours by 13%. , and is statistically significant, so that the repeal increased annual hours by 9% relative to the mean.
Columns 5-8 check the robustness of these findings to both measurement error and long-run trends in labor supply employing four-year rather than two-year differencing to the specifications in columns 1-4 (Griliches and Hausman, 1986) . These specifications indicate that the earnings-test repeal raised labor supply by 59-85 hours per year, which represented a 12-17% increase relative to the mean. Under the assumption that older men view the earnings test as a pure tax on earnings, these estimates translate into uncompensated labor-supply elasticities of 0.24-0.34-higher than typical elasticities found for prime-age men, but lower than many estimates for prime-age women (Blundell and Macurdy, 1999) .
The remaining rows in the table examine the impact of the repeal on the three alternative measures of labor supply. For the richer specifications in columns 2 and 6, respectively, the repeal did not increase labor force participation, as measured by doing any work or being retired, but did increase the incidence of full-time work. Specifically, the likelihood of full-time work rose 2.2-2.7 percentage points, or 12-15% relative to the sample mean full-time participation, which is consistent with the hours' response documented above. Table 6 presents estimates that test the theoretical prediction that the repeal had differential effects on hours by skill level: the repeal was more likely to have been inframarginal for low-and high-skill workers, but marginal for moderate-skill workers.
To do so, the specification is estimated separately by educational attainment group-high school dropout, high school degree, some college, and college degree-which proxies for skill level. The results for hours, on both the trimmed and untrimmed samples, are consistent with the prediction, namely there is no statistically significant impact of the repeal on hours for high school dropouts and those with college degrees. Instead, the bulk of the labor-supply response is centered on high-school graduates. For example, for the trimmed sample in row 3, columns 2 and 4, the repeal raised labor supply by 99 and 129 hours per year, or 19% and 26%, respectively, for high school graduates. Both estimates are statistically different than zero. In addition, the repeal was associated with an increase of around 2.2 percentage points, or 12% (relative to the mean), in the likelihood of full-time work in column 5 (row 1). Again, this effect was concentrated primarily on men with a high school degree (row 3), for whom the incidence of full-time work rose by about 19% (column 5) to 23% (column 6). Finally, Table 7 indicates that there is little evidence that the repeal increased labor force participation, as measured by doing any work and being retired.
To summarize, the repeal of the earnings test had a marked impact on the labor supply of older men, coming through an intensive-margin response. Across all men, the repeal raised hours and full-time work by around 12%. However, almost all of this effect was concentrated among high school graduates, for whom hours and full-time work increased by around 23%.
To help corroborate these findings, we split the sample into two groups, those with a high-school degree and all others, and re-draw the earnings distribution figures for each group for 65-70 year olds. Figure 4A indicates a substantial amount of bunching at the exempt amount for those with high school degrees before the repeal that disappears in Figure 4B after the repeal. Figure 5A shows bunching for all other education groups, which is diminished in Figure 5B , but it is much less pronounced than for those with a high-school degree. These patterns are consistent with the labor-supply findings that the bulk of the impact of the earnings-test repeal was on high school graduates.
VII. A Test for the Endogeneity of Self-Reported Health Status
Although it is widely understood that true health status is, in principle, an important determinant of the labor-force participation decision of older individuals, one difficulty, in practice, with using typical survey-based measures of self-reported health status, such as "Does your health limit your ability to work?" and "Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair or poor?," that has been long recognized in the literature is that individuals may rationalize being out of the labor force by reporting they are in poor health, so that these measures may be endogenous. Because the repeal of the earnings test generated plausibly exogenous variation in incentives to work, the rich array of information on health in the HRS provides a unique opportunity to test for endogenous reporting of health status.
Specifically, columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 present estimates of β − in (3) for the two self-reported measures of health that have been identified in the previous literature as being susceptible to rationalization and endogeneity: whether the individual reported that his/her health limited the ability to work and whether in fair/poor health. For all men (row 1), the repeal is associated with a decrease of 2.5-3.7 percentage points (or 9-13%, relative to the mean) in the likelihood that men say their health limited their ability to work, and these effects were statistically significant. The remaining rows in the table repeat the estimation for each education group. Remarkably, the bulk of this effect is concentrated on those with high-school degrees, precisely the group whose labor supply responded the most to the repeal. For these men, the repeal decreased by 5.4 to 8.1
percentage points, or 19-31% relative to the mean, the likelihood that these men said that health limited their ability to work. These effects were statistically significant. Although the estimates in columns 3 and 4 indicate no overall impact of the repeal on whether men report themselves in fair or poor health, they do indicate an effect for men with highschool degrees: a decrease in the likelihood of self-assessed fair or poor health of 3.3 to 3.8 percentage points, or 11-12% relative to the mean.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper examined the impact of the Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000, which abolished the Social Security retirement earnings test for those aged 65-70, on the labor supply of older men using data from the 1996-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Based on reduced-form specifications, we found that the repeal of the earnings test increased labor supply on the intensive margin by 12-17%, the bulk of which was concentrated among men with a high-school degree, whose labor supply rose by 19-26%. We formulated a unique test for endogenous reporting of health status by examining how reported health changes with the repeal of the earnings test and found some evidence of endogenous self-reported health status. In particular, older men were substantially less likely to have reported that health limits their ability to work after relative to before the earnings test repeal, with the bulk of the effect concentrated among men with high-school degrees, who had the largest labor-supply response to the repeal. 
